Tuesday, January 25, 2011

Latest on Twitter on Egypt protests

@Tharwacolamus: http://goo.gl/AStDu Today’s protests began in Sinai where, in surprising turn, Bedouin women took part hoisting Tunisian flags #jan25
@Dima_Khatib: Tens of thousands are protesting in Egypt, says Al Jazeera  #JAN25 #Egypt #aljazeera
@talatj: Etesalat just blocked Twitter I am using hootsuite #Egypt #Jan25
@Wa7damasrya: hint for workaround for twitter block http://www.labnol.org/internet/blogging/workaround-to-access-twitter-when-the-site-blocked/1894/
This might be another sleepless night for me... at the moment this sounds too good to be true:
@Tharwacolamus: Unconfirmed reports say Gamal Mubarak’s has left Egypt w/wife, daughter http://goo.gl/31hoR Source unreliable, need confirmation #jan25

Jan. 25, Egypt

Protests are ongoing right now in Egypt, after internet campaigns urging people to take to the streets and follow Tunisia's lead. Leading up to today, both the BBC and CNN have been almost downplaying the Tunisian effect on other Middle East countries, saying that Egypt will not see a Tunisian-style revolt. Although al-Jazeera is currently reporting that the protests are "scenes that the capital has not seen since the 1970s", given the lower internet penetration and larger size of the country, I'm starting to think that the BBC and CNN might be right. However I hope with all my heart that I'll be proven wrong. Here in Taiwan it's hard to find anyone who's keeping atop of these events: I once heard somewhere that there are only like two Taiwanese people in Egypt doing business, so the indifference is not unexpected. Still, the protestors in Egypt can be assured that their voice has been heard almost at the other end of the world, and even this far away they can find support for their cause.

Incidentally, the other end of the world from Taiwan is in Argentina, in a province named – what else could it be? – Formosa!

Update: Youtube footage of protests; also, Vodafone is also helping in its own way:
@VodafoneEgypt: Update: no blocking to any website from our side #Egypt #jan25

@yahya_sameh has a powerful image of a protester praying amid teargas:


Last but far from least, Mohamed ElBaradei calling out on Twitter:
@ElBaradei: The writing is on the wall. Hope regime gets it: change cannot wait.
@ElBaradei: Fully support call 4 peaceful demonstrations vs. repression & corruption. When our demands for change fall on deaf ears what options remain?
@ElBaradei: Threats of violence against participants in peaceful demos reveal the ugly face of a regime terrified of its own people

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Vote for Public Eye Awards 2011年世界最糟公司網路投票

http://www.publiceye.ch/en/vote/

The six nominated companies:
AngloGold Ashanti (poisonous gold mining in Ghana)
Axpo (Swiss energy company, buys uranium from Russian sources which disregard contamination)
BP (need I say more? I love their description: "What we did in the Gulf of Mexico will last forever. That's what we call sustainability!")
Foxconn (ditto)
Neste Oil (produces biofuel "Green Oil" which cleans out rain forests)
Philip Morris (endangers public health by challenging Uruguay's anti-smoke laws)

六個被提名的公司分別是:

AngloGold Ashanti(南非金礦公司,在迦納採礦造成嚴重環境汙染,毀了五十條民眾賴以維生的河流,並且虐待及射殺偷採礦的人)
Axpo(瑞士能源公司,所使用的鈾來自俄國Mayak地區的的處理廠,其汙水直接流入當地河流,不但造成環境汙染,也使得當地人嬰兒基因突變率增高)
BP(就是那個在墨西哥灣漏油堵都堵不住的公司,網頁上的宣傳標語很讚:「我們在墨西哥灣所做的事會造成永久的影響,這就是我們所說的永續經營!」)
Foxconn(富士康,不用多說明了)
Neste Oil(其在歐洲銷售的再生能源「綠油」,原料來自濫墾馬來西亞及印尼熱帶雨林後種植的棕櫚樹,卻宣稱他們的產品為「環保能源」,德國漢莎航空將於今年使用他們的燃料,屆時將更增加他們對環境的危害)
Philip Morris(美國煙商,向世界銀行申訴烏拉圭的菸害防制法規過於苛刻,進而強迫烏拉圭把法規修改到合他們所意的形式,並且積極在第三世界國家推銷菸草製品,以彌補先進國家的萎縮市場)

我自己的話,當然把票投給「台灣之光」富士康囉!

突尼亞西爆動及革命中文報導

台灣的新聞似乎對於突尼西亞近日的革命不聞不問,真的有關心此事的人也不多,就連《全球之聲》的相關譯文都很少(雖然英文版的相關文章不少),而且比英文版刊出的日期晚上好幾天。不過,我目前也沒有時間把我先前發的文翻成中文,所以就先貼上《全球之聲》的相關連結:


突尼西亞:失業男子自殺引發暴動


Gaddafi on the Internet

Gaddafi really is scared. Thanks to Global Voices for this translated excerpt of the colonel's simply ridiculous speech:
Even you, my Tunisian brothers. You may be reading this Kleenex and empty talk on the Internet.
This Internet, which any demented person, any drunk can get drunk and write in, do you believe it? The Internet is like a vacuum cleaner, it can suck anything. Any useless person; any liar; any drunkard; anyone under the influence; anyone high on drugs; can talk on the Internet, and you read what he writes and you believe it. This is talk which is for free. Shall we become the victims of “Facebook” and “Kleenex”* and “YouTube”! Shall we become victims to tools they created so that they can laugh at our moods?
*Kleenex is Gaddafi's reference to Wikileaks
The comments below are full of jokes on Twitter:

Gotta hand it to #Gaddafi though - no other #Arab dictator is mad enough to give a speech about #Tunisia revolution.
#BenAli told #US that #Gaddafi “not a normal person”, which explains why Gaddafi told #Tunisians in speech Saturday that BenAli best leader.
It's always a pleasure listening to #Gaddafi speak because you never know what shit will come flying out of that mouth http://bit.ly/huSYxm
I like this one the best:
 @CNN are the rumors true? Are producers working on a #gaddafi documentary in anticipation of his fall? #libya
And this sums it all up:
goodness, I can't believe #Gaddafi is a president. He is an actual JOKE.
Well, Gaddafi is not the President of Libya. He is only a Colonel with a really hot Ukrainian nurse who just so happens to have reigned Libya with an iron fist for the past 41+ years.

Just in on Twitter: WikiLeaks cable on Tunisia

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/01/06TUNIS55.html

This is just so good I'll repost the entire cable.

*****

Cable dated:2006-01-09T15:14:00S E C R E T TUNIS 000055SIPDISSIPDISSTATE FOR NEA/MAG - LAWRENCE AND INR  PARIS FOR ZEYALONDON FOR TSOUE.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2016TAGS: PGOV PREL TS

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a country that has had only one president for over eighteen years, suddenly and unusually, talk of the post-Ben Ali era is growing. Several senior and well-connected individuals have recently raised Ben Ali’s intentions for the future with Ambassador and other embassy officials. On the heels of Ben Ali’s recent illness (Ref A) and a new law providing for “former presidents” (Ref B), these discussions seem, on the surface, to be more relevant that the usual rumors. While we have no evidence that Ben Ali’s cancer has reached the life-threatening stage or that he is actively contemplating his retirement, there are some interesting scenarios being discussed, including the possibility that Ben Ali may groom a successor to run in the next presidential elections. Given the constitutional framework and the political scene, a successful candidate will likely come from the RCD Politburo.  None of the options suggest Tunisia will become more democratic, but the US-Tunisian bilateral relationship is likely to remain unaffected by the departure of Ben Ali. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S) One of the standard jokes about President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (usually delivered only half in jest) is that he has three goals for his presidency: to stay in power; to stay in power; and to stay in power. Ample evidence supports this view, including a 2002 constitutional amendment that he and the ruling RCD (Democratic Constitutional Rally) party pushed through which eliminated the two-term limit and effectively gave him the right to govern at least until 2014.  In recent months, however, increasingly concrete speculation has been voiced by well-placed contacts (and more casual observers) that Ben Ali does not plan to run again and may even step down before his term expires in 2009.

¶3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX recently told the Ambassador XXXXXXXXXXXX that Ben Ali wants to avoid the “difficulties” that arose when Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, declined in 1987. At the time, Ben Ali argued that Bourguiba was medically unfit to continue as president, while denouncing Bourguiba’s de facto presidency for life. One way for Ben Ali to ensure a smoother transition would be to groom a replacement and present him as the only viable candidate in 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX later told the Ambassador that, in fact, Ben Ali does not intend to run again in the 2009 presidential elections. This scenario, while hard to imagine for many who have witnessed first hand Ben Ali’s jealous control of all power in Tunisia, would allow the President to bask in the glory of being the first Arab leader to voluntarily and peacefully leave office.

¶4. (C) Average Tunisians spend more time commenting on Ben Ali’s health and omnipotent rule than the possibility that he may step down. Ben Ali, who has been rumored to have prostate cancer since early 2003, maintains an active schedule and appears healthy; but Tunisians often discuss whether he appears pale, thin or otherwise physically ill. While some people may state their hope that U.S. and European pressure could force Ben Ali to become more democratic or relinquish the presidency, they are at a loss when asked who would succeed him. Ben Ali’s policy of regularly changing ministers and other senior officials has ensured that no individual has widespread support, respect, or even substantial recognition among Tunisians.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

¶5. (C) The significant constitutional changes approved in a May 2002 referendum that allow presidential candidates up to the age of seventy-five led many Tunisians to assume that Ben Ali intends to remain president for life. In Ben Ali’s case, the changes allow him to run in 2009 and serve as president until the 2014 elections, when, at age 79, he will be legally too old to run for reelection. However, many Tunisians still cynically expect Ben Ali to change the constitution again to allow him to continue to serve as president until his ultimate demise.

¶6. (C) The constitutional amendments of 2002 also outlined legal procedures that address presidential illness, incapacity and death. According to the constitution, in the event of a temporary incapacity, the President can delegate some of his powers to the Prime Minister. During this interim period, the PM/acting president cannot dissolve the National Assembly, nor can he make changes to the Cabinet. (Note: During Ben Ali’s four-day October illness, he did not elect to delegate any authorities. End Note.) This system replaces the previous constitutional provisions, which Ben Ali used to remove Bourguiba, in which the Prime Minister was responsible for determining the president’s incapacity based on from seven doctors’ certifications that the president was no longer competent to carry out the functions of his office.

¶7. (C) In the event the President dies in office, resigns or is unable to carry out his duties due to illness or other incapacity, the Constitutional Council would meet to determine if the vacancy of the office was “definitive.” (Note: The nine-member Constitutional Council, which was created in 2001 as part of the above-mentioned constitutional revisions, is generally responsible for reviewing new laws to ensure conformity with the constitution. Four members are appointed by the President, three by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and three are members based on their government positions: the first president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Administrative Tribunal, and the President of the National Accounting Office.) An absolute majority of the Council would be required to render the presidency vacant. The Council must then advise the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Counselors, of this determination, which triggers the “immediate” but temporary investiture of the president of the Chamber of Deputies as interim president. The interim president must organize elections within 60 days, and cannot dissolve the Chamber, change the constitution, change the government, nor stand for election to the Presidency.

¶8. (C) Thus, under the current constitutional dispensation, if Ben Ali were to be “temporarily” incapacitated due to illness, he could turn over a measure of presidential authority to Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, an economist by training, is a respected figure in the “technocratic” mold. If Ben Ali were to die in office, resign for whatever reason, or become so ill he could no longer exercise his functions, the Constitutional Council could declare the Presidency “vacant” and interim authority would fall to Fouad Mebazaa, the current President of the National Assembly. Mebazaa is a long-time ruling RCD party stalwart (a member of the RCD Politburo, a former Minister, and a “survivor” from the Bourguiba era), whose principal task as interim President would be to organize elections and, from an RCD perspective, maintain the party’s hold on power.

WHO CAN RUN - AND BE ELECTED

¶9. (C) In order to be eligible to run for the presidency, a candidate must be no older than 75, be a member of a party with at least one member in parliament, and obtain the signatures of 30 deputies and/or mayors. Given the personality-cult status of the opposition parties (several of which are internally fragmented and weak) and their lack of organized platforms or significant membership, it is unlikely any opposition candidate would garner enough strength to seriously challenge an RCD member. It is most likely that the next president would come from within the RCD given its history as Tunisia’s founding party, its grass roots structure, and its interest in stability and continuity.

POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS

¶10. (S) Designating a successor may be the only means for Ben Ali to maintain his legacy as the man who brought “blessed change” to Tunisia. However, as he is an expert at shuffling his advisors and cabinet members to prevent any one individual from gaining sufficient political support to become a threat to the President’s rule, it is unclear who  this successor might be. Given the legal framework of the presidency, it is expected that the successor would come from the RCD Politburo -- whether handpicked by Ben Ali or following his death. Possible candidates, whose bio info is provided below, include Minister of State, Special Advisor to the President and Official Spokesman Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, Minister of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad Ali Chaouch, Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, Minister of Defense Kamel Morjane and First Lady Leila Ben Ali. None of these individuals would likely make any significant changes in GOT domestic or foreign policies, at least initially.
Minister of State Ben Dhia: Ben Dhia is often mentioned as a possible successor, given his strong position in the palace. Since he was born in 1936, Ben Dhia’s age is the prime obstacle to the likelihood he would be Ben Ali’s successor, as he also would be ineligible to run in the 2014 elections. However, rumored to be equally liked by the President and First Lady, Ben Dhia could act as a placeholder while a younger family member, such as one of Ben Ali’s son-in-laws, gained political power. Ben Dhia’s long history of government service, including under Bourguiba, may give him widespread public support, although his relatively secretive responsibilities in the palace cause some consternation among average Tunisians.  These same unknown responsibilities have also supported Ben Dhia’s reputation in Tunisia as an “eminence grise” - the brilliant behind-the-scenes decision maker in the palace.
Minister of Social Affairs Chaouch: Ali Chaouch (born in 1948) has held two positions that have given him great exposure to the Tunisian public: as RCD Secretary General from 2000-04, and currently as the Minister of Social Affairs. However, he also occupied the despised position of Minister of Interior, which while it may have given him the background to run a dictatorship, earned him little popularity with the Tunisian public.
Prime Minister Ghannouchi: (8/18/1941) A career technocrat and trained economist, Ghannouchi has served as Prime Minister since 1999. Ghannouchi is rumored to have told many that he wishes to leave the GOT but has not had the opportunity. The length of his service as PM also suggests that Ben Ali does not view him as a threat and that he is unlikely to be viewed as a qualified successor. However, average Tunisians generally view him with respect and he is well-liked in comparison to other GOT and RCD officials.
First Lady Ben Ali: (10/24/1956) While there are often rumors of Leila’s political ambitions, almost all observers note she does not have sufficient support among the Tunisian public. However, she cannot be ruled out as a possible successor, especially as she is widely believed to be at least partially responsible for many official appointments. If this is true, she has a wide range of political allies throughout Tunisian society that would support her -- even in the face of public disapproval.
Minister of Defense Morjane: (5/9/1945) Also affecting the credibility of succession scenarios is an oft-repeated notion that the US is favoring Morjane in the succession race. Morjane, appointed Minister of Defense in August 2005 after years of United Nations service, at one point had USG support for his candidacy to be the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and has been helpful as Minister. However, we know little about his personal politics or ambitions.

¶11. (S) COMMENT. Given the fact that Ben Ali has a dictatorial hold on Tunisia, it is hard to believe that he will voluntarily step down. We wonder that these discussions are not simply a ruse that will bring Tunisians - supporters and critics alike - out in force calling for another Ben Ali term. This would give Ben Ali the necessary cover that he is only responding to public demand for the continuation of his presidency, much as he did following the 2002 referendum that amended the constitution to allow him to run until 2014. However it is interpreted, the mere fact that an increasing number of Tunisians are talking about succession and the end of the Ben Ali era is remarkable. HUDSON

*****

As summarized on Twitter:
@Cyrenaican: oh wow ...that new wikileak release holy crap
Also on Twitter:
@halmustafa: Leaked document from Tunisian secret service reveals spying on Muslim Salafis,internet cafes & veiled women http://bit.ly/gVrZsh #SidiBouzid
Since this is in Arabic I'll have to trust the Twitter explanation on this one.

Reports on and about Tunisia

I was going to follow up a bit on this yesterday, but didn't have the time. In any case, foreign media outlets have become filled with op-eds and features on the Tunisia situation.

On the ground in Tunis, BBC's Adam Mynott mentions (remarkably, in an article already 3 days old!):
For the most part, the military is respected in the country, unlike the police who are reviled. So Tunisians have some understanding and tolerance for the numerous military checkpoints that they now have to go through to get from one side of Tunis to the other.
In an interview with PRI's The World, LA Times reporter Borzou Daragahi reports an incident he encountered at a train station, where crowds reacted angrily when police began roughing up a queue, and was only resolved when the military intervened. This would seem to corroborate Mynott's opinion.

I think US response to Tunisia has been simply disappointing: unlike France, whose lack of balls has widely been known as a fact,  the US still holds enormous sway over international opinion, and Hilary Clinton was in a particularly forceful position in Doha. However sharp her criticism was, though, it still fell short of directly accusing the other authoritarian regimes in the region, something which the US undoubtedly knows about, and which the WikiLeaks cables merely confirmed:
Washington has often been accused of paying lip service to human rights and democracy, calling for greater freedoms [ex. in Iran] while supporting autocratic rulers around the Arab world, from Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to Jordan's King Abdullah and the Saudi King
[…] 
But despite its slow response, described by critics as neglect, the US can probably still turn to other Arab rulers now and say "I told you so".
Exactly that: "I told you so" and no more. Writing for Al-Jazeera, UC Irvine professor Mark LeVine attacks Washington's double standards, and details what Obama's response should have been:
While the United States and the international community should not directly intervene unless the military begins killing or arresting large numbers of people, there are a number of steps Obama could take immediately to ensure that this nascent democratic moment takes root and spreads across the region.
First, the President should not merely urge free and fair elections. He must publicly declare that the United States will not recognise, nor continue security or economic relations, with any government that is not democratically elected through international monitored elections. At the same time, he must freeze any assets of Tunisia's now ex-leadership and hold them until they can be reclaimed by the Tunisian people.
Second, he should declare that the young people of Tunisia have shown the example for the rest of the Arab world, and offer his support for a "Jasmin Spring" across the Arab world. Obama should demand that every country in the region free all political prisoners, end all forms of censorship and political repression, and fully follow international law in the way they treat their citizens or the people's under their jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the President should call on every country in the region to move towards free, fair, and internationally monitored elections within a specified time or risk facing a similar cut-off of ties, aid and cooperation. Such demands must be made together with America's reluctant European allies.
Of course, such a call would apply to Israel as much as to Egypt, to Morocco as well as to Saudi Arabia. There would be one standard for every country from the Atlantic to the Indian ocean, and the US would pledge to stand with all people working to bring real democracy, freedom and development to their peoples and countries and to oppose all governments that stand in their way.
Imagine what would happen to America's image in the Muslim world if the President took such a stand? Imagine what would happen to al Qaeda's recruitment levels if he adopted such a policy (in fact, al Qaeda has been equally behind the 8-ball, as it was only Friday that the leaders of the movement's so-called Maghrebian wing declared their support for the protests in Tunisia and Algeria).
Imagine how hard it would be for so-called "supporters" of Israel to attack the President for finally putting some teeth behind his criticism of Israeli policy (which Clinton in Doha incredulously said the US could do nothing to stop) if he could reply that he was only holding Israel to the same standard as everyone else and that his policies were actually protecting America's core interests and security?
Obama has time and time again demonstrated his rhetorical eloquence, most recently in addressing the shooting in Arizona; but his response – at least up to now – regarding Tunisia has been decidedly lackluster. Then again, Reagan's speech in front of the Brandenburg Gate was also not immediately well received, and it was only after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 that the significance of "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall" became retroactively recognized.

Another widely retweeted piece has been one by Ethan Zuckerman of Global Voices. Although the internet and social media did play a strong role in the revolution (most importantly, because Ben Ali had already responded to protestors' requests to loosen internet controls), he stresses that in the end it was up to the will of the people, and it is simply too early to call it another "Twitter revolution" à la 2009 Iran:
Pundits will likely start celebrating a "Twitter revolution" in Tunisia, even if they missed watching it unfold; the Atlantic's Andrew Sullivan already revived the dreaded phrase Thursday. Others are seeking connections between unfolding events and a WikiLeaks cable that showed U.S. diplomats' frustration with Ben Ali, and with denial-of-service attacks by online activist group Anonymous, which has been targeting entities that have tried to stop the dissemination of WikiLeaks cables, like the Tunisian government. But any attempt to credit a massive political shift to a single factor -- technological, economic, or otherwise -- is simply untrue. Tunisians took to the streets due to decades of frustration, not in reaction to a WikiLeaks cable, a denial-of-service attack, or a Facebook update.
But as we learn more about the events of the past few weeks, we'll discover that online media did play a role in helping Tunisians learn about the actions their fellow citizens were taking and in making the decision to mobilize. How powerful and significant this influence was will be something that academics will study and argue over for years to come. Scholars aren't the only ones who want to know whether social media played a role in the end of Ben Ali's reign -- it's likely to be a hot topic of conversation in Amman, Algiers, and Cairo, as other autocratic leaders wonder whether the bubbling cauldron of unemployment, street protests, and digital media could burn them next.
Echoing the point that "Tunisians took to the streets... not in reaction to" internet information is another often retweeted message:
@hamadi: Bouazizi et tous les morts ne demandaient pas l'ouverture de youtube #sidibouzid (Bouazizi and all those killed were not demanding YouTube access)
And although an interim government has now been formed and things seem to be following the constitutional process, Nathan J. Brown cautions that this could still be seen as a mere extension of Ben Ali's legacy: if Article 57 was indeed invoked in speaker of parliament Fouad Mebazaa becoming acting president, the fine print in the current constitution will still not allow free and fair elections:
The presidential elections have to be held according to the current constitutional provisions, and those allow only the Potemkin parliament (and a few other officials) the ability to nominate candidates. And while the acting president is serving, no constitutional amendments are allowed. In other words, invocation of Article 57 kicks into gear a process that was carefully designed for Ben Ali. It is designed for a figure handpicked by current top leaders, not for a truly open election.
Add to this the current cabinet lineup, where the PM, interior, and foreign ministers have all retained their posts, and opposition figures now holding relatively inconsequential (at least for the foreseeable future) positions, this throws the future into further doubt, even as the impact of the revolution has begun to spread out to other countries in the region (numerous self-immolation attempts in Algeria, Egypt, and Mauritania, as well as continued unrest in Libya). Also, the richer Arab states seem to be buying off any potential protestors with price cuts and government subsidies, as Enduring America's liveblog suggests.

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Latest lowdown in Libya, according to Twitter

@Gheblawi: latest news from #Libya sporadic clashes between squatters and property owners and security forces, but quitter than Friday when it started
@Cyrenaican: YouTube in #LIBYA is blocked, confirmed sorry for the back and forth on that one mates
@bijlal: #Libyans, use VPN http://www.mediafire.com/?sda4csthedpddwp to break the censorship and protect your privacy.#Libya #sidibouzid 
@Gheblawi: Government in #Libya is trying to control the situation by tribal and local committees and avoiding using force as much as possible 
It seems apparent that something is going on in Libya, but if @Gheblawi and Twitter accounts from yesterday (protests in three cities, police only watching on and not firing) are accurate, this might lead into another Tunisia-model turn of events. The hashtag #libya is going crazy right now, nearly 200 tweets and retweets every 10 seconds.

Just in:
@Dima_Khatib: @L_badikho What I have been trying to find out was whether gvt might be blocking youtube now because something is really happening #libya

Ripple effect already??

@JheefaKhaleefa: Youtube coverage protest banning of youtube by govt. Revolution is happening in Libya NOW!
@hafuntish: Gaddafi addresses Tunisian people, message intended as a plea to Libyan people not to turn on him #Libya #Sidibouzid 
@weddady:  dear main stream media, would u please take 15 minutes of your busy news cycle to verify reports of protest in #libya? thank u! #sidibouzid

If this is true, then is Gaddafi next?

Video of Gaddafi's address:
@weddady: No need to know Arabic: Kaddafi is SCARED & rambles on #Tunisia uprising. He's more incoherent than ever http://bit.ly/ifb2na #Libya
Reuter's coverage of Gaddafi's speech; seems to be the only traditional news source that has been touching on Libya ever since #libya first flooded with signs of revolt. In particular:
"What is this for? To change Zine al-Abidine? Hasn't he told you he would step down after three years? Be patient for three years and your son stays alive," Gaddafi said.
[…]
Gaddafi said the turmoil would only be justified if Tunisia adopts his model of rule -- known as the Third Universal Theory -- which replaces representative democracy with direct rule by the people through institutions called popular committees.
He said this model "marks the final destination for the peoples' quest for democracy. If this is what the events (in Tunisia) are for, then it has to be made clear". 
Just utter Gaddafi nonsense: his TUT sounds as credible as North Korea's Juche hocus pocus. As per @weddady, he is scared.

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Jan. 14, 2011: Overwhelming

I've already tried writing a blog on and off for several times now; each time I never got past one or two posts before I found the whole thing ridiculous. Why would anyone want to know what I ate today (nada), how freezing cold the weather here is like right now (can't feel my feet), or what my paltry opinions on some other master writer or thinker, whose level I could never rise to, were?

Friday, however, was simply just too emotional for me. I feel I just had to let my insides out.

I had just spent the day at school, the bulk of which was spent in a marathon session listening to several of the dance department graduate students present their final reports, and nitpicking a few of the students' reports on some really irrelevant issues – the whole session could have ended perhaps an hour earlier, if I didn't bring up the all the problems in the transplantation of subculture in one country to pop culture in another, which then somehow led into questions in gender empowerment in female dance roles, and invoked a huge, protracted back-and-forth between me and just about all the teachers sitting in the panel, while leaving the student actually presenting in the cold. Plus I really didn't know what I was talking about. Needless to say I wasn't feeling too pleased with myself when I crashed into bed as soon as I reached home.

When I woke up later in the evening, the most remarkable thing began to unfold. I had already been aware of the unrest in Tunisia and Algeria since they began, but like many others around the world, it felt like the post-election protests in Iran in 2009: a lot of steam at first, word spread via new social media such as Facebook and Twitter, and rapidly gaining in momentum. Yet Iran ended with a crackdown, with Ahmadinejad forcing the opposition into the background, in the end nearly wiping their voices off mainstream world news sources. This, even with the tacit support of Facebook and Google (adding Farsi support and tools) and, more significantly, the US government (by asking Twitter to delay an upgrade). If a revolution could still be suppressed even with such heavyweight backing, how would these new developments in north Africa possibly succeed?

And so the unraveling of events in Tunisia also caught me by surprise, along with a feeling of exhilaration. Earlier in the day I had already read how Ben Ali, in his third public address in a single month, spoke for the first time ever in Tunisian Arabic; this language factor alone signified that even he was aware of the gravity of the situation. As I sat transfixed in front of my computer, it quickly became apparent that just about the entire world was caught off guard with the rapid turn of events: Ben Ali saying he will step down in 2014; Ben Ali fleeing the country; PM Mohammed Ghannouchi as acting president; parliament speaker Fouad Mebazaa as acting president. 
@MW_A: Qui l'eu cru, la #Tunisie a connu en moins de 23H plus de présidents qu'en 23 ans #sidibouzid #tunisia (Who would have believed that Tunisia had more presidents in less than 23 hours than in 23 years)
I was up until 3AM last night listening to the BBC World Service and callers from all around the Arab world congratulating the Tunisians for their achievement, and hoping that their success will be replicated in other countries. The first thing that came to my mind was Egypt, in the wake of their horribly rigged elections last year; and indeed Mohamed ElBaradei has spoken out:
@ElBaradei: Tunisia :repression + absence of social justice + denial of channels for peaceful change = a ticking bomb
@ElBaradei: The courage of the Tunisian people to uphold their freedom & dignity is a shining light and a trailblazer. Change only comes from within.  
The internet is ablaze with praise, but I just hope that the effects of Ben Ali's "Tunisian" address – by ordering the police not to shoot – will be just as long-lasting and start the same ripple effect as Günter Schabowski's misinterpreted response of the "immediate" opening of the Berlin Wall. The fact that a curfew is now in place, with the military taking a strong stance in enforcing it, makes this all the more worrisome. Not another Iran, please! When the Berlin Wall fell, I was too young to understand its impact, and I was almost envious of my high school history teacher when she told about how she collected newspaper clippings throughout the fall of the Iron Curtain, knowing that that would be a once-in-a-lifetime event. If I can afford to be just a little selfish, I hope that I can relate to my future students how I kept the same close watch on events launched by Jan 14, in the same way as my history teacher. 20 years ago it was newspaper clippings; now it is an overwhelming wave of Twitter snippets, blog posts, YouTube videos, and general citizen media. Revolution will never be the same.

For myself, things to learn: Write! Twitter!